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Abstract
A simple cellular automata model for a two-group war over the same
“territory” is presented. It is shown that a qualitative advantage is not
enough for a minority to win. A spatial organization as well a definite de-
gree of aggressiveness are instrumental to overcome a less fitted majority.
The model applies to a large spectrum of competing groups: smoker-non
smoker war, epidemic spreading, opinion formation, competition for in-
dustrial standards and species evolution. In the last case, it provides a
new explanation for punctuated equilibria.
PACS: 01.75+m, 05.50+q, 89.90+n
Physics has dealt with quite a success in describing and understanding collective
behavior in matter. Very recently many physicists have used basic concepts and
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techniques from the physics of collective disorder to study a large spectrum of
problems outside the usual field of physics such as social behavior [1, 2, 3], group
decision making [4], financial systems [5] and multinational organizations [6].
See [7] for a review of these applications.
A few years ago, Galam has developed a hierarchical voting model based on
the democratic use of majority rule [8]. In the simplest case of two competing
parties A and B with respective support of a0 and b0 = 1 − a0, it was shown
that, for the B, winning the elections at the top of the hierarchy (i.e. after
several tournaments) does not depend only on b0 but also on the existence of
some local biases. In particular, in the case of voting cells of four persons, a
bias is introduced (usually in favor of the leading party, e.g. B) to solve the
2A-2B situations. Then, the critical threshold of support for the ruling party
to win can be as low as bc = 0.23. The model showed how a majority up to 0.77
can self-eliminate while climbing up the hierarchy, using locally the democratic
majority voting rule. This self-elimination occurs within only few hierarchical
levels.
Following this previous study, we address here the universal and generic
problem of the competing fight between two different groups over a fixed area.
We present a “voter model” which describes the dynamical behavior of a popu-
lation with bimodal conflicting interests and study the conditions of extinction
of one of the initial groups.
This model can be thought of as describing the smoker - non smoker fight:
in a small group of persons, a majority of smokers will usually convince the few
others to smoke and vice versa. The point is really when an equal number of
smokers and non-smokers meet. In that case, it may be assumed that a social
trend will decide between the two attitudes. In the US, smoking is viewed as
a disadvantage whereas, in France, it is rather well accepted. In other words,
there is a bias that will select the winner party in an even situation. In our
example, whether one studies the French or US case, the bias will be in favor of
the smokers or the non-smokers, respectively.
The same mechanism can be associated with the problem of competing stan-
dards (for instance PC versus Macintosh for computer systems or VHS versus
Beta MAG for video systems). The choice of one or the other standard is often
driven by the opinion of the majority of people one meets. But, when the two
competing systems are equally represented, the intrinsic quality of the product
will be decisive. Price and technological advance then play the role of a bias.
Here we consider the case of four-person confrontations in a spatially ex-
tended system in which the actors (species A or B) move randomly. The process
of spatial contamination of opinion plays a crucial role in this dynamics.
In the original Galam model [8], the density threshold for an invading emer-
gence of B is bc = 0.23 if the B group has a qualitative bias over A. With
a spatial distribution of the species, even if b0 < bc, B can still win over A
provided that it strives for confrontation. Therefore a qualitative advantage
is found not to be enough to win. A geographic as well a definite degree of
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aggressiveness are instrumental to overcome the less fitted majority.
The model we use to describe the two populations A and B influencing each
other or competing for some unique resources, is based on the reaction-diffusion
automata proposed by Chopard and Droz [9]. However, here, we consider only
one type of particle with two possible internal states (±1), coding for the A or
B species, respectively.
The individuals move on a two-dimensional square lattice. At each site, there
are always four individuals (any combination of A’s and B’s is possible). These
four individuals all travel in a different lattice direction (north, east, south and
west).
The interaction takes place in the form of “fights” between the four indi-
viduals meeting on the same site. At each fight, the group nature (A or B) is
updated according to the majority rule, when possible, otherwise with a bias in
favor of the best fitted group:
• The local majority species (if any) wins:
nA+mB →
{
(n+m)A if n > m
(n+m)B if n < m
where n+m = 4.
• When there is an equal number of A and B on a site, B wins the con-
frontation with probability 1/2 + β/2. The quantity β ∈ [0, 1] is the bias
accounting for some advantage (or extra fitness) of species B.
The above rule is applied with probability k. Thus, with probability 1− k the
group composition does not change because no fight occurs.
Between fights both population agents perform a random walk on the lattice.
This is achieved by shuffling randomly the directions of motion of the fours
individuals present at each site and letting them move to the corresponding
neighboring sites [9].
Initially, populations A and B are randomly distributed over the lattice,
with respective concentrations a0 and b0 = 1− a0.
It is clear that the model richness comes from the even confrontations. If
only odd fights would happen, the initial majority population would always
win after some short time. The key parameters of this model are (i) k, the
aggressiveness (probability of confrontation), (ii) β, the B’s bias of winning a
tie and (iii) b0, the initial density of B.
The strategy according to which a minority of B’s (with yet a technical,
genetic, persuasive advantage) can win against a large population of A’s is not
obvious. Should they fight very often, try to spread or accept a peace agreement?
We study the parameter space by running cellular automata implementing the
above system.
In the limit of low aggressiveness (k → 0), the particles move a long time
before fighting. Due to the diffusive motion, correlations between successive
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Figure 1: Phase diagram for our socio-physical model with β = 1. The curve
delineates the regions where either A (on the left) or B (on the right) wins
depending on b0, the initial density of B and k, the probability of a confrontation.
fights are destroyed and B wins provided that b0 > 0.23 and β = 1. This is the
mean-field level of our dynamical model which corresponds to the theoretical
calculations made by Galam in his election model [8].
More generally, and for β = const, we observe that B can win even when
b0 < 0.23, provided it acts aggressively, i.e. by having a large enough k. Thus,
there is a critical density bdeath(k) < 0.23 such that, when b0 > bdeath(k), all A
are eliminated in the final outcome. Below bdeath, B looses unless some specific
spatial configurations of B’s are present.
This is a general and important feature of our model: the growth of species
B at the expense of A is obtained by a spatial organization. Small clusters that
may accidentally form act as nucleus from which the B’s can develop. In other
words, above the mean-field threshold bc = 0.23 there is no need to organize in
order to win but, below this value only condensed regions will be able to grow.
When k is too small, such an organization is not possible (it is destroyed by
diffusion) and the strength advantage of B does not lead to success.
Figure 1 summarizes, as a function of b0 and k, the regions where either
A or B succeeds. It turns out that the separation curve satisfies the equation
(k + 1)7(b0 − 0.077) = 0.153.
It is also interesting to study the time needed to annihilate completely the
looser. Here, time is measured as the number of fights per site (i.e. kt where
t is the iteration time of the automaton). We observed that, in this case, the
dynamics is quite fast and a few units of time are sufficient to yield a collective
change of opinion.
The previous results assume a contant bias. However, with the assumption
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Figure 2: Same as figure 1 but for a bias computed according to the B density on
a local neighborhood of size ℓ = 7. The gray levels indicate the time to eliminate
the defeated species. The black dots on the left hand side of the separation curve
show situation where the B species wins due to an accidentally favorable initial
configuration (dark for long time).
that an individual surrounded by several of its congeners becomes more confident
and thus less efficient in its fight, one may vary the bias β as a function of the
local density of B.
For example, within a neighborhood of size ℓ2, the bias can decrease from 1
to 0 as follows : β = 1− b/(2ℓ2) if 0 ≤ b ≤ 2ℓ2 (local minority of B’s) and β = 0
if b > 2ℓ2 (local majority of B’s), where b designates the number of B’s in the
neighborhood.
This rule produces an interesting and non-intuitive new behavior. Depending
on the value of ℓ, there is a region near k = 1 such that the A species can win
by preventing the B’s from spreading in the environment. This is achieved by
a very aggressive attitude of the A’s. Note that this effect is already present in
the previous case (ℓ = 1 and β = const), but only on the line k = 1 and for
b0 < 0.2.
Figure 2 summarizes the regions where either A or B succeeds when ℓ = 7. In
addition to the separation line shown in light gray, the time needed to decimate
the other opinion is indicated by the gray levels. We observe that this time
may become large in the vicinity of the critical line. Depending on the time
scale associated with the process, such a slow evolution may be interpreted as
a coexistence of the two species (if a campaign lasts only a few days or a few
weeks, the conflict will not be resolved within this period of time).
We have shown that the correlations that may exist between successive fights
may strongly affect the global behavior of the system and that an organization
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is the key feature to obtain a definite advantage over the other population. This
observation is important. For instance, during a campaign against smoking or
an attempt to impose a new system, it is much more efficient (and cheaper) to
target the effort on small nuclei of persons rather than sending the information
in an uncorrelated manner.
Also, according to figure 2, an hypothetical minority of smokers in France
must harass non-smokers during social meetings (coffee break, lunch,...) rather
often but not systematically, in order to reinforce their position. On the con-
trary, for an hypothetical majority of smokers in the US, either a smooth or a
stiff harassment against the non-smokers is required to survive.
Aggressiveness is the key to preserve the spatial organization. Refusing a
fight is an effective way for the A species to use its numerical superiority by
allowing the B individuals to spread. With this respect, a minority should not
accept a peace agreement (which would results in a lower k) with the leading
majority unless the strength equilibrium is modified (i.e. B is better repre-
sented).
Motion is also a crucial ingredient in the spreading process. There is a subtle
tradeoff between moving and fighting. When little motion is allowed between
fights (k → 1), the advantage is in favor of A again. In an epidemic system,
our model shows that two solutions are possible to avoid infestation: either one
let the virus die of isolation (dilute state due to a small k) or one decimates it
before it spreads (large k).
Finally a simple variant of the above model provides a possible scenario to
explain punctuated equilibria [10] in the evolution of living organisms. It is well
known that the transition between two forms of life may be quite abrupt. There
is no trace of the intermediate evolutionary steps. To give some insights into
this problem we modify our voter model by including a creation rate for the B
individuals (A → B, with probability p ≪ 1). In this context, the B species is
fitter than the A species (the bias β = 1) but the numerical advantage of A is
too strong for B to survive. However, if the simulation is run for a long enough
time, nucleation in this metastable state will happen, which will produce locally
a very favorable spatial arrangement of B’s. These B’s will then develop and,
very rapidly, eliminate all A’s. In other words, a very numerous species may
live for a considerable amount of time without endangering competitors and
suddenly, be decimated by a latent, fitter species. This scenario needs a strong
statistical fluctuation but no additional external, global event.
In conclusion, although the model we propose is very simple, it abstracts the
complicated behavior of real life agents by capturing some essential ingredients.
For this reason, the results we have presented may shed light on the generic
mechanisms observed in a social system of opinion making.
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